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“The method is the same in all cases—in philosophy, in any art or study. We must 
look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms, and we must supply 
ourselves with as many of these as possible …” Aristotle wrote in Analytica Priora1. 
One of the “terms” discussed here is the Suez undertaking of Great Britain, France, 
and Israel while the other one is the Hungarian Revolution which broke out on 
October 23, 1956. 
In this essay, we will summarize what we know 
about the connection between the two parallel 
crises. Applying the Aristotelian method, we will 
gather together “as many of these connections as 
possible.” This is of utmost importance since 
archival sources at our disposal are quite 
incomplete. 
The chronological parallel is obvious: the onset of 
the Hungarian Uprising on October 23, 1956 and 
the Israeli onslaught against Egypt on October 29, 
1956 are very close to one another in time. 
However, was there any other connection beyond 
their simultaneity? Did the two crises have any 
affect on one another, and if so, how? From 
among the numerous questions two which arise 
are of fundamental importance which need our 
special attention: 1) How much did the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution affect 
the planning and execution of the Suez intervention? 2) Did the Suez question 
influence the tragic fate of the Hungarian revolution, contributing to the Soviet 
intervention. In what follows we will try to find responses to these two questions. 
The simultaneous series of events in Hungary and in the Middle East received major 
coverage in the world press. Recalling this “unbelievably feverish period,” André 
Fontaine, the editor-in-chief of the foreign political column of Le Monde, says that 
there were mornings when, affected by the piles of news arriving from these two 
crises areas, the front page had to be changed several times: “At eight o’clock we 
decided to emphasize Suez and yet, another half an hour later, Hungary was ahead. 
And then again it changed.”2 In the minds of many people living at different points of 




For example, in several neutral states as well as among the majority of Canadians 
and West-Germans, the general consensus formed that the Soviets would never 
have dared to intervene in Hungary with such cruelty and cynicism had the British 
and the French not handed to them such an outstanding distraction. Hundreds of 
university students in Hamburg demonstrated with the inscription on their placards: 
“Eden is the assassin of Budapest.” In France, however, the majority of the public 
emphasized a different aspect of the question: they resented that the UN condemned 
the Soviet Union only verbally for the Hungarian intervention while, following the 
British and French action in the Suez Canal, the UN decided to deploy UN forces.3 
The contemporary Hungarian press, daily papers, and the Budapest Hungarian radio 
regularly reported developments in the Suez crisis from October 29 on. Except for 
foreign reaction to the Hungarian revolution, this was the most extensively discussed 
topic of the foreign news. Based on news agency reports and newspaper coverage, 
the events of the Suez action were covered closely. Great attention was given to 
debates within the UN since these related to the Hungarian question as well. Later, 
due to the fact that the revolutionaries had greatly expected to receive military aid 
during the uprising but that none was forthcoming, and due to the propaganda of the 
Kádár regime, an unfavorable view of the French and the British took root in 
Hungary. This view held that the French and British followed their self-interest in 
ignoring Hungary, even as the occupation by the Soviet Union developed, in order to 
use the situation to attack Egypt. 
As mentioned earlier, both the Suez question and the Hungarian Revolution was 
considered to be a significant event by the international media. With the passing 
years, a large amount of historical literature had been written about both events. In 
the1960’s and 1970’s only secondary sources were available to analyze global 
political relations: the press, official announcements, and memoirs. Lacking archival 
documents, analysts had to rely on assumptions about the most important questions. 
But beginning in the second half of the 1980’s, the holdings of American, English, 
French, and other western archives became available for research. With the collapse 
of East-European communist regimes in 1989-1990, it became possible to look at 
their government and party documents relating to the Hungarian revolution. In 1992-
1993 even a segment of Soviet documents became available to researchers.4 
English language documents about the Suez issue usually treat the Hungarian 
question as a marginal affair although there do exist authors who try to combine the 
two events and strive to reveal the connections.5 As the French literature, along with 
historical works which deal exclusively with the Hungarian Revolution, concise 
monographs analyzing the 4th Republic, French foreign policy after World War II, and 
international relations in general often dedicate extensive discussions to the topic. 
Most French books mention the temporal coincidence of the Hungarian Revolution 
and the Suez issue.6 Certain analysts point out that France and Great Britain 
capitalized on the Soviet Union’s occupation with the Eastern European 
disturbances,7while other publications have only called attention to the contradictions 
of the events’ reception in France.8 
There were several Hungarian papers written as well which dealt with the 
connections between the Hungarian events and the Suez issue. According to 
Hungarian historiography during the Kádár era, there was a close connection 
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between the two crises: English and French leadership had considered the events in 
Hungary and a presumed occupation by the Soviet Union when deciding on the 
timing of the attack against Egypt. The best known book about the Suez Crisis 
reflecting a Kádárian view is László Salgó’s A szuezi háromszög 1956 [The Suez 
Triangle: 1956] which emphasized that the French government “timing the 
intervention on October 31 was supposed to have meant guarantees that the Soviet 
Union—due to the Hungarian Revolution—would be unable to take decisive steps in 
the interest of Egypt.”9 Applying a montage technique by combining the events at 
Suez and in Hungary, the author claimed that the two events were closely connected 
from the very beginning, that they developed in parallel, and that the French-British 
decision was premeditated. 
Representatives of western Hungarian emigrants also sought answers to basic 
questions about globally significant political events. Historian Miklós Molnár, who 
lives in Switzerland and is of Hungarian origin, concluded that because of the news 
about the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution, representatives of the Allies, 
conferring in Sévres on October 22-24, 1956 to prepare for the Suez intervention, set 
the date for the Israeli attack earlier than planned in order to utilize the unexpected 
engrossing occupation by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he also held to the 
view that the Suez question affected the Hungarian Revolution since the Suez events 
impacted the policy of the Soviet leadership on Hungary. However, Molnár did not 
consider this to be the only not the decisive cause of Soviet decisions.10 Emil 
Csonka’s book, published in Munich, also claimed it is probable that the British and 
French Suez action influenced Soviet decision-makers at forming their views about 
Hungary. “The moment the Kremlin understood that the West’s attention could not 
focus exclusively on the Hungarian question, that the leading western powers were in 
serious conflict over the Suez question, and that Central and Eastern Europe was no 
longer Washington’s main preoccupation—rather, it was to discipline England and 
France—it was dead sure that it could do anything with Hungary it wanted.” However, 
Csonka also did not consider the effect of the Suez action on the Soviets decisive 
either.11 Béla Király, the former Commander of the National Guard, stressed during 
an interview that, “at least indirectly, Suez damaged us” since it was Suez that 
occupied the UN’s attention instead of Budapest and since “the Soviet leadership 
might have contemplated that the aggression against Hungary could be executed 
with less loss of prestige.”12 
Following the 1989-1990 change of regime in Hungary, books exempt from the 
ideological distortions of the Kádár regime could finally be published. A high school 
textbook, Az 1956-os magyar forradalom [The 1956 Hungarian Revolution], which 
summarized all the questions relating to the Revolution, for the first time also 
mentioned the Suez connection. The authors were also of the view that the Middle 
Eastern conflict shifted the world’s attention away from Hungary. However, the Suez 
action is not listed among the causes of the November 4 second Soviet intervention 
which crushed the Hungarian Revolution.13 
Now that we have had an overview of significant contemporary opinions and those 
reflected in scholarly literature on the interconnections between the Suez and 
Hungarian crises, let us set out to examine how the significant amount of government 
documents newly available for research, and publications based on them, affect our 
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image of the events and what responses they offer to the basic questions asked 
earlier. 
Csaba Békés was the major scholar who studied the British government’s archives 
on its response to the Hungarian Revolution. According to Békés, “the Hungarian 
uprising did not exert any significant effect on the development of the British policy 
either on the timing of the Suez campaign or during the time period before launching 
the attack against Egypt.”14 Although the British Ambassador in Budapest, Leslie Fry, 
fully identified with the goals of the Hungarian Revolution and sent numerous 
telegrams to London, his reports did not illicit any significant reactions by the British 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He hardly received any response to his telegrams. On the 
other hand, my research in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Archives Diplomatiques)15 proves that French diplomats—although affected more 
closely by the Algerian war and the Suez events—paid closer attention to the case of 
Hungary. Documents and interviews with French diplomats on assigned posts in 
1956 indicate that Foreign Ministry officials received the news of the Hungarian 
Revolution with sincere sympathy and a desire to help. To understand the dual crises 
is complicated by the fact that, until the outbreak of the Suez War, neither the British 
nor the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs were informed about the secret military 
preparations since only the highest level officials participated in preparations for the 
Suez intervention. Only these highest-level officials knew about the British-French-
Israeli talks of October 22-24, 1956 in Sévres. 
What were these secret conferences about? Did they also discuss the uprising in 
Budapest? Denis Lefebvre’s work does not mention this. The last scholarly view 
about this question, of which I am aware, was published in Georgette Elgey’s book in 
1997. The especially well-informed and well-connected French historian utilized 
documents and the testimony of French witnesses that she had saved for almost 25 
years. Our first basic question which we posed at the beginning of the Epilogue was 
how the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution affected negotiations in preparation for 
the Suez intervention. Elgey wrote that, “In Sévres (on October the 23rd) the Israelis 
and the French had been pursuing unsuccessful negotiations the whole day. 
Unexpected dramatic events in Budapest during the night served as an excuse to 
convince Ben Gurion, who was about to leave, that he should stay on in France. The 
French kept repeating that the time had arrived to step up against Nasser. A more 
favorable situation could not have been dreamt. Neither the Americans, preoccupied 
with a presidential election, nor the Russians, struggling with the Hungarian uprising, 
would be able to hasten to help Nasser.”16 That was how the French leaders spoke 
about the occupation of Hungary by the Soviet Union. But why was the Hungarian 
uprising used as an excuse? Was it because of the timing of the Suez intervention? 
Csaba Békés, who was the first to examine the interrelations between the Suez issue 
and the Hungarian Revolution, set out to reconstruct the relationship between the two 
series of events by using British and, to a certain extent, Israeli documents. 
According to him, Ben Gurion’s diary indicates that the news of the Hungarian 
uprising did not influence the timing of the Israeli attack since all the major items on 
the script later executed by Israel, Great Britain, and France had already been 
conditionally determined on the first day of the Sévres conference on October 
22.17 “At setting the conditional time, the British and French Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs urged an Israeli attack to occur as soon as possible.”18 The underlying motive 
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behind this urgency might have been that French and British military forces, in 
preparing for an attack against Egypt, had been standing by for a long time and it 
could not have been kept at a high level of readiness for a long time. 19 
Israeli historian Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, who has written about the connections 
between the Hungarian and Suez events based on Israeli sources, has pointed out 
that David Ben Gurion had seriously considered a possible Soviet military 
intervention in case of a Franco-Israeli-Egyptian war. What is more, he was afraid 
that “Israel would be the only target of the Soviet retaliation, especially if Israel 
initiates the war by itself.” During the Sévres conference the Israeli Prime Minister 
shared these worries with the French. Probably in response to this, the question of 
the Hungarian uprising also came up at the conference: “… The Polish and 
Hungarian events played important roles during the discussions. The French Foreign 
Minister, Christian Pineau, described the advantages of immediate action. In his 
view, the Soviet Union’s problems in Poland and Hungary decreased the probability 
of Soviet intervention in Egypt.”20 
In sum, according to sources available at the present time, it can be assumed that 
the issue of the Hungarian uprising came up during the Sévres talks, during the 
preparation for the Suez action, but that it was not significant at determining the 
timing of the attack. In his diary Ben Gurion does not even mention the Hungarian 
events in connection with the French-British-Israeli talks.21 
  
The agreement at Sévres had the Suez Action begin on October 29 with Israeli 
troops attacking Egypt. From that point on, the Hungarian uprising became significant 
for the British government due to the United States’ fierce conduct because of the 
action in the UN. The Security Council put the Hungarian question on its agenda on 
October 28. However, the British tried to delegate the question to the emergency UN 
Assembly meeting convened to discuss the Suez events in order to shift and divide 
attention.22 Consequently, their attitude towards the Hungarian question was 
subordinated to the Suez question. A similar approach could be detected in the case 
of French foreign policy.23 For example, the French delegate’s October 27 
instructions from Paris included the fact that the French government opposed setting 
up an examining committee for the Hungarian question since it would have created 
an unpleasant precedent when the Suez issue later received publicity. Following the 
start of the attack in the Middle East, the French followed the British in trying to utilize 
the Hungarian question to alleviate the protests that broke out in the United Nations. 
“Do not allow the [Hungarian] question to be pushed into the background when the 
UN’s full attention is given to the Israeli-Egyptian question,” the Foreign Ministry 
wrote to the leader of the French UN mission.24 Due to American resistance, and in 
spite of the British and French plans, the Hungarian question was tabled at the 
November 4 emergency UN Assembly meeting convened to discuss the Suez issue. 
What is the explanation for the United States so decidedly countering the intentions 
of its most important allies? “From the very beginning of the Suez campaign, the 
Americans were aware of the real motives underlying the English (and French) efforts 
described above. … The American leadership was of the view that, since they lack 
effective tools to influence events in Hungary which belonged to the Soviet sphere of 
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interest, they ought to concentrate on solving the Suez crisis where they had to 
impress their own political-military allies and not another super power in opposition to 
them.”25 For Washington, the Middle East was far more important than Eastern 
Europe, as was the third world at large which Washington was trying to draw into its 
own political and economic sphere while also preventing the Soviets from gaining 
power in these areas. 
Now that we have summarized the kind of policies which the leading western powers 
pursued in connection with both crises taking place during the Fall of 1956, we will 
examine Soviet views and measures which had such a fatal impact on the outcome 
of the Hungarian Revolution. This will make it possible for us to respond to the 
second fundamental question raised early in this paper—whether the Suez crisis 
affected the tragic fate of the Hungarian Revolution and whether it contributed to the 
Soviet intervention? 
During the Hungarian crisis the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, the highest 
political forum of the Soviet Union, was in almost continuous session. The notes of 
Vladimir Nikiforovic Malin who at that time directed the General Department of the 
Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and participated in the Presidium’s 
sessions, give a comprehensive overview of the Presidium’s debates, their turns and 
decisions.26 There are two allusions made to the Suez case in these writings. The 
first one is on October 28 before the launching of the Israeli attack on Egypt on 
October 29 and before the British and the French would interfere on October 31. As 
Khrushchev said, “The English and the French have started to stir up trouble in 
Egypt. Let us not get in company with them.”27 The chief party secretary—who must 
have gained information about the Anglo-French preparations from intelligence 
sources28—might be alluding here to the enormous difficulties the British and the 
French would encounter in the case of military action.29 After days of hesitation, on 
October 31 the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party decided on the military 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution. In the minutes of this session, which 
proved to be so decisively important for the Hungarian Revolution, the following 
sentences attributed to Khrushchev can be read: “If we withdrew from Hungary, it 
would encourage the American, English, and French imperialists. They would 
attribute it to our weakness and would swing into attack. We would demonstrate our 
weakness [with the withdrawal]. In that case our Party would not understand us. 
Besides Egypt, we would give them Hungary as well.”30 According to these 
statements, the Soviet leader “placed Hungary in the context of the Suez situation 
which he considered to have been decided on that day. During the following days the 
Soviet military advisors were withdrawn from the area.”31 Accounting for his decision, 
the chief party secretary kept mentioning one factor—to defend the imperial 
prestige.32 Thus it seems that Khrushchev did not wish to seem weak. Conclusively, 
the British-French-Israeli venture had a share in Moscow’s decision to order the 
crushing of the Hungarian Revolution. The question is to what extent and in what way 
did it contribute. 
On October 30, the previous day, the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party 
assented to the Soviet government statement that Soviet military units—whenever 
the Hungarian government asked—would be withdrawn from Budapest and the 
Soviet government was ready to discuss the eventual complete withdrawal from 
Hungary. What explains such a radical change in Khrushchev’s and Presidium’s 
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views by the 31st? Soviet archival resources at our disposal—which is still minimal 
despite the recent discoveries—do not make an unambiguous answer possible. Is it 
the Suez case? There is no direct evidence for that since the most recent 
developments of the Suez crisis—the deployment of British and French troops—did 
not come up during that session of the Presidium’s.33 On the other hand, in similar 
situations—Berlin in 1953 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—the Soviet leadership never 
needed a Suez-type stimulation to come to such a decision. The first Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary—on October 23, 1956—could also be brought up in this 
context. In other words, in all likelihood the Soviet troops would have been deployed 
to crush the Hungarian uprising even without the Suez events since, by the end of 
October, the extent of changes in Hungary exceeded the threshold the Soviet leaders 
found acceptable: a vision of the total collapse of a communist dictatorship had 
emerged while a democratic regime was developing. All these automatically 
threatened the unity of the Soviet bloc.34 
At the same time the Suez action might have facilitated the decision about the Soviet 
military intervention by extending an excellent distraction to thwart a probable 
international uproar in the wake of the bloody crush of the uprising in Hungary. 
Based on archival materials and publications derived from them, it seems that there 
was not only a temporal coincidence between the Suez and Hungarian crises during 
the Fall of 1956. And, the two events met not only in the columns of the world press 
and in the different forums of the UN—which had been functioning mainly as a 
propaganda device for a while anyway. Although the two series of events stem from 
totally different causes—the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the threat to Israel 
were in the background of the action against Egypt, while in Hungary it was the crisis 
of the Stalinist-type regime—the two crises influenced and affected one another. 
Most recent results of archival research give significant evidence of the connections 
between the two series of events. Therefore we can offer the following responses to 
our basic questions: although the confusing situation in Europe and the Soviet 
Union’s occupation must have come up at the Sévres meeting of the British-French-
Israeli allies on October 22-24 in preparation for the Suez action, this question did not 
influence their changing of the date of attack. Raising the issue, the British and 
French tried to reassure the Israelis who feared a Soviet military counter-attack. On 
the other hand, the Suez action could not have affected the final outcome of the 
debate in the Kremlin since they had been discussing Hungary’s fate for days. 
However, it may have had a secondary affect on its decisions. 
We have tried to examine, in Aristotle’s words, “what relates to the two things in 
question and what those two question relate to.” Although we have tried to 
summarize “as many of these as possible,” we cannot give final answers. 
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